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Summary findings
Aron and Elbadawi  compare and contrast the design  and  Tle  auctions  in Nigeria and Zambia, on the other
outcomes of differenr foreign  exchange  auctions in four  hand, were subject to frequent policy  interventions,
countrics in Sub-Saharan  Africa  and present a typology  rcsulting  in unsustainable  auctions, inefficient  allocation
of such auctions.  of foreign exchange  (through ad hoc disqualificadons),
They identify two distinct sets of countries in terms of  limited unification, and a rather volatile exchange  rate.
the auctions' fcaturcs, policy  interventions, and  The conclusions  reached by Aron and Elbadawi  are
outcomes.  broadly corroberated by a statistical  analysis of weekly
In Ghana and Uganda, the exchange  rate auctions are  micro-auction  data for all four countries.
judged to have been largely  on target in exchange rate
unification, exchange rate stabilization,  and efficient
allocation of foreign exchange.
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Following  the economic  crisis that impacted  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA)  from the second  half
of the 1970s, the unification  of exchange  rates (official  and parallel)' and integration of parallel
markets  into the  official  economy,  has been a major  policy  objective  for reforming  African  countries.
The extent of macroeconomic  imbalances  (especially  fiscal) that have prevailed in SSA and the
rudimentary  nature  of economic  institutions  (such  as the banking  system), provide  a strong case for
a gdualistic  approach  for exchange  rate unification  in SSA. In this context, centralised  multi-unit
auctions  for foreign  exchange  were introduced  from  the early 1980s  in SSA as a transitonal medium
towards a credible and sustainable unified regime (such as.  an efficient, decentralised interbank
market). A brief overview  of the structre  of foreign  exchange  markets in SSA  (including  auctions)
is contained  in sub-section  1.  1 below. Further,  sub-sction 1.2 provides  a discussion  on the objecdves
and rationale  for the choice of foreign auction  markets  as an initial component  of the exchange  rate
unification  reform  in SSA.
The objective  of this paper is to conduct  a basic  analysis of auction data to explain the
different  outcomes  regarding the auction  objectives  (e.g. exchange  rate unification)  that have been
observed in SSA This paper studies.  foreign exchange  auctions in four African counties: Ghana,
Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia. The auctions' periods covered  by the study are: 19 Sep. 1986 to 5
March l992 for Ghana, 26 Sep. 1986 to 24 Nov. 1988  for Nigeria, 31 Jan. 1992  to 7 May I993 for
Uganda, and 11 Oct  1985  to 24 Jan. 1987  for Zambia. While auctions in Ghana and Uganda are
generally  considered  to have  been  fairly sucessf  those of Nigeria  and Zambia  proved  unsustinable
or produced  considerable  exchange  rate volatility.  We hope that the typology  of auctions  developed
in this paper will help to inform the imroved design and conduct  of auctions  at the micro-leveL  A
further objective of this paper is to provide the background  for a more rigorous analysis in  a
companion  paper (Aron and Elbadawi, 1994),  which models  the micro-es  of the auction
rates for the above  four countries, and tst  some policy  propositions  motivated  by aucton theory.
1.1  Multiple Foreign Exchange and Auction  Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa
For most SSA  countries, exchange  rate policy was  static from Independence  until the 1980s,
playing  no role in balance  of paymen  adjustments.  The fixed  exchange  rate regimes  of the 196Ds  and
early 1970s  appeared  to be viable, given consistent  macroeconomic  policy and a relatively  favorable
exal  environment By  the second  half  of the 1970s,  however, hese economies  had been weakened
by public expenditure.  booms (exhibiting  ratcet  effects) following the positive shocks in ol  and
commodities  markets.  Adverse  and persistent-terms  of trade (TOT)  shocks  from the mid-1970s  fiurher
drained  foreign  exchange  reserves in many  SSA  countries,  bringing  their exchange  rate regimes  under
pressure. In most cases, the overvalued  exdhange  rates were defended  by the rationing of foreign
mThe  term unificafion  in the SSA context refers to eradicaon of the parall  nrket.  However, since  these
counries ac  likely  to maintain  capital contols in the mdimn  term,  there would remain  a small  role for the parl
market in meeting portfolio demand- Our concept of unification in SSA is thus a substantial reduction of the panre
markct  so that it is no longer a major signal in the economy.-2-
exchange, and more stringent capital and import controls were imposed. One consequence  was a
burgeoning  of illegal,  parallel markets in foreign  exchange.
Parallel  markets  in SSA have shown a tendency  to expand  rapidly. In contrast  to most Latin
American countries,  where small quasi-legal  black markets  operate as a sideline to official  multiple
markets  with premia  typically  below 60 percent, illegal  black  markets  in SSA are major  markets,  with
substantial  premia. Of  the ten SSA  countries  considered  by Kiguel  and O'Connell  (1992),  the average
parallel  prenium for 1970-89  exceeds  90 percent  for six countries,  and 150  percent  for two countries.
Since  the 19S0s,  the  current and long-nm  costs of multiple  markets  for foreign  exchange  have
been  increasingly  emphasized  by multi-lateral  donors  and  governments.  The  negative  macroeconomic
implications  of official  multiple  markets  (the Latin Ameican case)  largely hold for official/unofficial
multiple  markets  (the SSA case) (Kiguel  and O'Connell, 1992).  However,  the African case must be
disdnguished  by the prominent  role for illegal  markets. The large size of unofficial  markets and of
premia  Leans  there is considerable  diversion  of trade and productive  activity  into ilegal channels,
with a narrowing  of the tax base. Domestic  prices may  lagely be detrmined in parallel markets  and
strongly influenced  by changes  in the parallel premium.  Flight from domestic  currency  reduces  the
savings base for domestic  investment,  presenting  a severe constraint  on long-term  growth. Another
consequence  is wide-spread  speculative  activity-  The  is clearly  a strong case  for the elimination  of
parallel markets.
The question  remains  how a sustinable unification  of multiple  markets  might be achieved.
Flexible exchange  rar  arragements to this end have chatrized  most I.M.F. and World  Bank-
supported  programs  since 1983  (Quirck  et al, 1987).  These  fal into  two categories:  interbank  markets
in foreign exchange,' and a number of innovative eximents  using foreign exchange auction
Markets.3  Potentially these mark-de  d exchange rates hold a  nUmber  of advantageS  for
counties with thin  foreign  exchange  markets  over non-market  alternatives,  such as the crawling  peg
They wre  efficient  in rationing  foreign exchange  and reduce manipulation  in dtin markets; can allow
a more  certain path for reserve  management;  avoid  the choice  of the appropriate  exchange  rate, and
can serve to distance  the government  from the political costs of devaluation  (Krumm, 1985).
Auctions  may  hare advantages  over interbank  markets  where  there is insufficient  institutional
depth to  allow effectiv  functioning of a  decentralized  foreign exchange market, where a  few
commercial  bankcs  have historically  been domiant and there is a danger  of collusion,  or where there.
are linited sources  of foreign  exchange. 4 Given the stmctural  characteristics  of Sub-aharan African
countis,  therefore, auctions  potilly  have an important  role to play  in exchange  rate unification,
Counties  whih  have  used  interba  mark  inlude  Zai.  Th  Gmbi,  Siera  Leone  and Nigeria  (in  tandem
with  an  auction).
3 Courics  which have estabihod  various types of axchange  rate auctions  incude Bolvia (1985 onwards).  Jamaica
(198-89) and Afiican counies,  Ghana (1986-92).  Nigeria  (1986-94),  Guinea  (1986-),  Zambia  (1985487).  Sierra  Leone
(1982-13),  Uganda  (1982-15,  1992-93)  and Ethiopa (1993-).
'There  are disadvantages  too i  e incrased admin  requiremas  of a ctalized  system,  ic potetial  for
govenment mnulati  of the excuhge  rate or fr  rest-seeking,  and a Closer  Lssociation  of the governme  to the
politics of the cxchage  rate..primarily  as a transitional  device  to an efficient  interbanc  nmarket.A  Yet to date  there  is  little
understanding  of the functioning  of auction markets ia Sub-Saran  Africa, and there has been
virtually  no research  on the causes  of freWent  policy reversals  or auction  failure. Apart  fron  supply
problems  due to initial  conditions  of market thinness and vulnerability  to terms of trade shocks and
fluctuations  in the disbursement  of foreign aid, poteial  causes of failure include macroeconomic
laxity, inapropriate auction design and poor micro-magement  of auctions.
1.2  The Rationale for Transitional Foreign Exchange Auctions in SSA
The principal objective of exchange rate libc.-aisation in SSA is unificaion of multiple
exchange  markets into a single market, or at least to  inrrow  significandy  the gap between  the rates,
so that the free/black market premium no longer constitutes a major signal in the economy. This
objective  of a realistic  exchange  rate which reflects  market conditions,  inially has far greater priority
dt  a second objective, that of stilizing  the echange  rate. Stabilization  is crucial in some Latin
American  economies,  where  the parallel  market is small relative to the official  market, and where the
fred-through  coefficient  from official  devaluation  to inflation  in near hyper-inflationary  conditions  is
very high (0.6 for Bolivia (Dominguez, 1991)). In SSA many prices already reflect the parallel
exchange  rate, so that official  devaluation  is unikely to have a significant  effect on inflation  (Aron
and Elbadawi  (1992)).  Stabilization  in SSA wil assume increasing m  e  as real depreciation is
ahieved. Neverteless, reducing  voaLility  in the transitional  period is also desirable  for all the usua
reasons:  in SSA, exchange  rate volatility has been shown to be the most important  deerrent for
intors.  Volatility is in part related to a limited supply of foreign exchange,  which is based on
highly concenated  exports of primary commodities,  vulable  to TOT shocks,  and on donor aid,
also subject to shocks.'
A third important  (and perhaps underesdmated)  objecdve is the restructuing of domestic
production dtrough a market-determied allocation  of foreign exchange. Allocation  accordig  to
competitive  market valuations should allow scarce foreign exchange to be utilized in an efficient
manner.  Damaging  distorons were introduced  by the praice  of ma-ua allocation,  with fvoitism
and incentives  for wastefid  rent-seeing activities.  Moreover, the  sem  pepeated  large, inefficient
parasttals,  which have proved a drain on scarce  foreign exchang  and on tb's  budget
Given  the rudimentary  nature  of many  markets  in SSA, and of institutions  such as the  baning
system, auctions  potendally  have  an important  role to play in the establishment  of deeper and more
stable markets  in the  transition  to efficient,  ised inbank  markets.  Auction  markets  have  two
advanges  olrer interbunk  markt  in constaining volatility in thin mkets.  Fist,  they may be
feasbly opeted  in conjunction  with a stabilizaion fimd, which can commit  supply in the medium-
term and still offer a market-based  rate. Secondly,  auctions  are in  ionly-rich,  and this may be
5  This is how the reltdiy  succei  and lengthy  uificato  expmea  in Ghan pgremsed
'Desabising  capial  flows  a  cnst  id  by d  capital  contols  prese  in tact  SSA counties and arm  lily  to
be maintained  for the modium-erm.  Thee  ay  be consideable outflow  i  cail  fligti, howevcr (rea  and
Elbadtaw,  1992).-4  -
exploited  by the seller in two ways. By appropriately  revealing  information  or adjusting  the reserve
price and supply, uncertainty  may be reduced,  speculative  pressures  stemmed  and collusion  limited.
hence stemming  volatility. On the other hand, auctions give the seller information  about private
agents' valuations; in signalling demand pressures auctions can be  used to enhance monetary
management. 7 This-  was found to be a principal  advantage  of the auction in Bolivia (Domigue,
1991).  This macro-micro  interaction  resulting  in improved  monetary  management  also enhances  the
credibility  of auctions.
An auction system has significant  advanges  over the interbank system in allocation of
foreign  exchange  in thin markets.  There is no reason to assume  that a fair and efficient  allocation  will
occur where predominantly  state-owned  banks or a highly concentrated  commercial  banling sector
allocate foreign exchange  to final customers  (after a wholesale auction of export proceeds, or a
decentralized  purchase  of export  receipts).  Indeed,  practice  shows  otherwise  -in  a concenatd  sector,
the banks  possess  considerable  allocational  autonomy,  with favored  customers  and bank shareholders
first in line. Auctions  offer the possibility  of restricting  entry through a set of rules which reflect
development  priorities,  but stl  maintain  market-allocation.  These rules can be liberalized  over time.
Thus, for example,  foreign  exchange  for lumiry  goods  can be limited  to repatiated flown capital.  The
problem  of an asymmetic set of importers,  diffiated  by credit-worthiness  and production  costs,
could  be addressed  in a number  of ways, for instance  by clatve  caps on allocation  for very large
users of the limited  supply of foreign exchange,  at least for a tansitional period.
Thus, the significant  advantage  of auctions  in SSA is that they offer an informaionaly-rich
frework  and the possibility  of gradually  liberalizing  auction restictions in the progression  toward
deeper and more competiive financial markets.  Unfortunately,  associated  with this strength is the
license  it offers goverments to manipulate  an auction  and to engage  in ad hoc interventions.  This is
the main reason  for the current disaffection  with auctions  amongst  some  within  the donor community.
This point has to be addressed  squarely, and we believe that there is scope to design trsparent
auctions  which reduce manipulation  by the seller-
The structure of tAe  rest  of the pape  is as follows.  Section 2 gives a typology  of foreign
exchange  auctions  in the four countries. A detailed  statistical  analysis  of micro-auction  data  from the
above  four auctions  is contained  in section  3. Section  4 conains a brief macroeconomic  interpretation
of the auctions' outcome. Section  5 concludes.
2.  DESIGN CHARACUERISCS  OF AUCFIONS IN SSA
The design characteristics  for the Zambian, Ugandan, Ghanaian  and Nigerian auctions  are
summarized  in Table 1. These case-studies  present  a wide specum  of auction  designs  and outcomes
71t might  be argued that a black marke or  reign  cxchange  bureaux markt  offes the sam  signallig advanages
as an auction. This is false: these markm  are vey  hin markts  awd rec  the influence of remainig  tad  restitions
and exchangc  conols,  as well as vaous  demand  prssur  not constmt  wih development  priorties, such  as
smuggling  aivts.-5  -
for cross-country  comparisons.  In three of the countries,  different  auction  types follow consecutively,
allowing  within-country  comparisons  of auction design. in this section we compare and contrast
auction  designs and outcomes across countries, and motivate hypotheses  concerning the effect of
auction  design  on the achievement  of policy  objectives  such as stabilization  of the exchange  rate, and
unification of multiple exchange markets. Some of these hypotheses will be tested in a second
companion  paper (Aron and Elbadawi, 1994).
2.1  Duration and frequency of the aucfions
The various auction experiments  have spanned  widely different periods. In Ghana, weekly
auctions  of varying  design were held  over almost  6 years, and then replaced  by an interbank  markiet,
with decentralization  of the sale of most export receipts. The same result has been achieved in
Uganda, although after a considerably  shorter period of auctions (about 21 monits). In both these
countries  the auctions  proceeded  fairly  smoothly,  and the rules were gradually  liberalized  over time.
By contrast,  an IS-month  experiment  in Zambia  with 68 weekly  auctions, saw restictions tightened
over time and frequent  rle  changes.  The auctions  were suspended  for three months; subsequently  a
further  6 auctions  were held, but a speculative  run on the kwacha  saw the system abandoned,  with a
return  to a fixed  exchange  rate regime. In Nigeria, auctions  have  similarly  yielded mixed  results, and
bave  been  subject  to considerable  rule changes.  Auctions  were  held over six years, weekly  for the first
67 auctions,  during 1986-88;  then daily during 1989-90,  in conjunction  with an interbank  market; a
weekly  system was again  initiated  early in 1991, and continued  untdl  early 1994, when the exchange
raze  was  fixed. The competitiveness  of the 1989-90  auctions  in Nigeria  is in doubt:  participants  were
guarateed a mxmum  aDlocation  regardless  of their bids. We therefore examine  only the 198648
periodL
There may  well be a relationship  between  the duration  of the auction  regime and the success
of the outcome, though this will obviously  depend on the initial depth of the financial and foreign
exchange markets. Admirers of the Ugandan and Ghanaian outcomes suggest that a slow and
unambitious  start, tgther  with gradual  expansion  of the aactions through  liberalization  of the rdes,
served  both to facilitate  institution-building  and learning, and to enhance  the credibility  of the reform.
However,  auction  stability  in these countries  is also importantly  related  to other  design features, such
as tansparency and the use of a reserve price, both of which were hallmarks of the Ugandan  and
Ghnaiaa auctions.
A higher  fteucn-x of auctions  would seem  desirable  since this could smooth disbursement,
make  fims'  production  more flexible,  and probably encoura  investmenL  Furte,  the speculadve
behavior  or over-bidding  that might occur in more sticky markets  would be curmiled. On the other
hand, a high  equency auction  market may be so tiin that the marginal  price would probably  not be
a useful guide to the exchange rate, and would in any case be rather volatile between auctions.
Further, there may be increased inentives  for collusive behavior amongst bidders. For the SSA
auctions  under consideration,  weekly or bi-weekly frequencies  were employed, and in general the
demand  for foreign  exchange  exceeded  the supply in fairly deep markets.-6-
2.2  PricIng
Two types of pricing mechanisms  have been used in these auctions. These are the
discriminatory  or Dutsh auctions,  where bidders pay their own price for each uit;  and comvstitive
auctions,  where bidders pay the lowest  accepted  bid price for each unit. The clearing  rate for all the
auctions  was defined  as the marginal  rate at which  the available  supply is exhausted,  when ordering
the bids from the highest  to the lowest price. All four countries  used the Dutch action,  although  the
first auction  in Ghana  used competitive  pricing, and Zambia  and Nigeria  preceded  their  Dutch auctions
with, respectively,  42 and 24 competitively-priced  auctions. The stated rationale  for the choice of
Dutch  over competitive  pricing  was  two-fold:  raising  revenue  through  discriminatory  pricing; and the
disincentive  toward depreciadon  thought  by some  policy-makers  to be embodied  in the Dutch pricing.
While there is no theoretical  justification for the latter view, the former  proposition has proved
controversial  in the auction literature (e.g. the U.S. Treasury Bill auction  debate). There are also
potenial disadvantages  to Dutch pricing: first, if there is a large spread between  bids, this may be
constued as conitutng  a multiple  exchange  rate system,  with the attendant  disadvantages  (Quirckl
1987); and secondly, a smaller  pool of bidders may ensue because  the Dutch auction introduces  a
barrier to entry for risk-averse bidders who are poorly informed about market developments
(Goldstein, 1962).  Theory  predicts  that Dutch pricing  lessens collusion  (Robinson,  1985);  but some
authors are of the view that through a narrower range  of bidders, Dutch pricing may also encourage
collusion  (Quirck et al, 1987).  Given that Nigeria and Zambia  included  both types of auction, some
of these issues could  be subject  to empirical  verification.
The official buy and sell exchange  rates for all these countre  were closely based on the
clearing  rate. Where an interbank  market  operated in oonjunction  with the auction (e.g. Nigeria),  the
buylsell rates in this market  were constained to lie within some margin of the auction rate.8
2.3  Competition and the nature of bids
Two types of sale have been employed  in the SSA foreign exchange  auctions. In the eail
aucdons, the bidders were private and public sector importers, and bids were channelled  through
commercial  banh.  In some cases  the  mues  were liberalized  to allow the banks to compete  for their
own  requireme.  This system  was  used in Zambia,  and for 174  auctions  in Ghama.  The Central  Bank
opened  sealed  bids for each importer, specifying  the quant  of foreign  exchange  desired, the price
that the importer was willing  to  pay for it and the intended usage of the foreign exchange. These
auction  markets  attracted  between  100  and 600 bids,th  the potential  for a competiively-determined
exdchage  rate (the numbers  of bids are shown in Table 2).
By cont,  in the wholesale  auctions  used in Nigeria  and Uganda,  and later in Ghana,  the
bidders were registeed banks  or foreign  exchange  dealers. The system adopted  in Nigeria initially
allowed  an unc  I  secondary  market for foreign  exchange, so that banks competed  freely in
the action  for later resale  to importers  in the interbank  market (see Table 1). Each bank submitted
l Ua  rse  price is usd  (see sub-setion  2-5). a quantiy-weighted average of the reserve prie  and the bids
above k coud  detemine the echange  stte.  This was the pratice  in BolivaL-7-
one bid. In Uganda and Ghana  (1990-92),  ttie banks were constrained  to submit aggregated  quantity
bids at the various prices bid by importers  (and possibly  themselves).  The number  of bids opened  by
the Central Bank to determine  the clearing  rate in either case  was thus far smaller than in the retail
auctions  (Table 2).
The danger in the Nigerian  scenario,  is that allowing  banks  full autonomy  in bidding  for and
then  dispensing  foreign  exchange  in a secondary  market, could, in concentrated  financial  markets, lead
to collusion.  Banks could  offer bids below their own value  of the foreign  exchange,  but resell at the
markt  price, thus widening  the spread between the buy rate (i.e. the auction rate) and secondary
(interbank) market sell rate, with rents accruing to the banks. This appears  to have occurred in
Nigeria, obviously defeating the objective of unification. Moreover, it is not obvious that the
subsequent  allocation  to final customers  would  be optimal: indeed  anecdotal  evidence  from Nigeria
suggests that the bank's shareholders  and favoured customers had privileged access to  foreign
exchange  in the secondary  market'. Auction  theory advises tha auction managers  employ  a reserve
price (below which foreign  exchange  will not be sold) to combat  suspected  collusion  (McAffee  and
McMillan, 1987).  A reserve  price was not employed  in Nigeria.
Under the strict monitoring  of the wholesale  system used in Ghana and Uganda, the low
mnmber  of composite  bids need not have affected  the potential  for a competitively  determined  auction
rate. Nevertheless,  the possibilities  for  collusion  do seem  to be greater,  given  the reduced  wanarency
of the system. Both Uganda  and Ghana  used an unnounced,  though  fairly  predictable,  reserve  price,
around which the bids cluslered  over time. Thus, the clearing rate was influenced  with reference  to
some target, so that the system resembled  a  crawling peg, though with a mare  (not manual)
allocation  of foreign  exchange.  This convergence  of bids (see Table 2) oould  either have  represented
the bidders learning the reserve price rule over time; or possibly collusion  amongst  bidders. The
reserve  price is discussed  further in sub-section  2.5 below.
2.4  Entry and allocative restrictions
A limited  supply  of auctionable  funds,  and significant  excess  demand  has in practice  been used
to justify entry barriers on grounds of allocation. Typical entry barriers are: confining  the use of
foreign  exchange to particular  sectors; confining  the use of foreign exchange  to particular  qtpes of
imports  (typically  exduding luxry  goods);  and limiting participation  by commercial  banks, licensed
foreign  exchange  bureau and the state-owned  sector (e.g. with ceilings  on their maximum  allowable
allocation,  or complete  exclusion  from the auction).  To enforce  these  various  exclusions,  bidders are
monitored  dirough documentation  requirements,  such as evidence  of paid up tax, deposits  with the
commercial  bank  filing  the application,  and import  and export invoices.  An  unintentional  entry  barrier
has in some cases been posed by the varying credit-worthiness  of bidders in imperfect  financial
markes. All the SSA  auctions  required  a local currency  cover  for bids, and some  smaller  companies
apparently  found their access  unfairly  restricted  (e.g. in the Zambian  and Ugandan  auctions).
'The  exiacnr  or considerable  ms in te  Nigeran aucdon is reflected  in the prolifastion of licanced  banks,
which incased  in nmber from 41 in 1986  to 112  by early 1991.-8 -
One trade-off with entry barriers, Is that transactluns  costs for bidders In terms of the time
involved in preparing bids may impose a disincentive  to use of the auction, and it is obviously
important  to streamline  the.  license  and bank applications  procedure.  It also seems  clear that efficiency
would  be enhanced  if there were reduced sectoral  constraints.  On the other hand, the non-eligibilt
of some  consumer  and luxury Items  seems  reasonable,  at least in the early  stages  of an auction  regime,
when it may t.l vulnerable  to speculative  pressures.
Another problem  arising with entry restrictions  is that where barriers are not clearly  defined,
they  effectively  decreae transparency  in the auction,  granting  license  to the authorities  to m"nipulate
the set of bidders. In Zambia, disqualifications  -.ere ad hoc at various times in a deliberate  attempt
to suppress depreciation. Apart from the non-market  pricing and allocation  this may induce, the
perceived  credibility  of the reform may be jeopardised  (see also sub-section  2.6).
Expanding an auction through the liberalization  of various barriers to entry will increase
competition,  and therefore bid prices, as importers  previously  satisfying  needs on the parallel  market
or buremau  d  change (or not at all), move into the auction. While the auction rate is expected  to
increase, the volatility of the rate over time may decrease, due to a more competitive  and credible
system. Auctions  where entry restrictions  were increased  over time (e.g. Zambia  and Nigeria)  seem
to have  traded  a less depreciated  real rate for increased  volatility and a larger black  market  premium.
A paramount  reason for the success  of the Ghanaian  auctions  was a gradual  widening  of the
auction  system, combining  trade and exchange  rate liberalisation.  This served to increase  competition
and foster confidence  in the system,  deepening  fincial  markets  by allowing  institution-building  over
time.  A t-tier  system operated for about six months:  when these windows  were unified  in early
1987, all transactions  were settled through the auction market. Access  to the auction was widened
thereafter  through a step-wise  inclusion  of additional  goods and services, while import resticto
were relaxed. By early 1988  virtually  all consumer  goods  were eligible,  and import Licensing  finally
abolished  by early 1989. Current invisible payments  were liberalized  over the same period. The
foreign  exchange  bureaux  were legalized  early in 1988, and late in 1989  allowed  to bid in the auction
with the commercial  banks, on behalf of final users.  At the same time, decisions  concerning  the
eligibility  of auction bids was transferred  to the commercial  banks and eligible  bureaux.  Finally, the
sale of non-cocoa  exports  were decentralized  t  the banking  sector in early 1991.  These  moves  paved
the way for the transition to a less concentrated  interbank  market, less liable to collusive  practices.
Uganda similarly  successfully  liberalized  the set of restrictions  on impors and bidders over time.
Finally, an important  question is whether  the state  sector should be included  in the auctions.
It would be naive to ignore  the political economy  of public enterprises. With fixed exchange  rates,
and manual  allocation  of foreign  exchange,  parastatals  are the principal  beneficiaries  of exchange  rate
rents. As large employers,  parastatals  have a powerful  political voice; they may  also impose  intrnal
party  pressures  on the government  (as occurred  in Zambia).  This suggests  that shock  therapy  resulting
in the rapid demise  or even bankruptcy  of parastatals  is to be avoided.  In anycase  the negative  impact
on the budget of such an event could be significant. On. the other hand, there are significant
allocational  gains  to be had from not perpetuating  such a system.  In Uganda,  Ghana  and Nigeria,  state
enterprises  competed  in the auction  and received  no prior allocations.  With the change  of the Nigerian-9-
auction  system in 1989, however, public enterprises again had direct access  to foreign  exchange
though  the Central  Banol  In Zambia,  the largest  parastatal  by far, the state copper  nmining  company,
received  allocations  outside  the auction.  Oher parastatals  were  included  from February,  1986,  but the
heavy  users  of foreign  exchan,  the oil  and airways  ste  companies,  bid competitively  for only  a few
auctions,  and were then allocated  on average 40 percent of the auctioned  foreign exchange  at the
marginal  rate. Thus,  a crucial  determinant  of supply  to the  private  sector  was  the privieged allocation
to the state sector: only about  25 percent  of total foreign  exchange  inflows  were actually  auctioned
in Zambia  during 1985-87.
2.5  Informational rules
There are three ways in which  information  could  be revealed  by the auction managers:  first,
the use  of a (fairly  predictable,  or possibly  pre-announced)  reserve  price,  which  reflects  the authorities
value of the auctioned  foreign exchange;  secondly,  pre-announcement  of the supply  of auctionable
foreign  exchange,  or commiment  of supply  over the medium-term;  thirdly, publication  of the nature
and/or  number  of biddersfcomposite  bids. These are considered  in tiU.
Auction  theory recommends  the use and pre-announcement  of a gay_pr_ydm particularly
where  bidders'  valuations  of foreign  exchange  are "affiat  (where  one bidders's high value  makes
more likely a high valuation  in other bidders)-  There is probably  an element  af affiliated  values  in
foreign  exchange  auctions,  and it is then to the seller's advantage  to provide  information  about  the
value  of the auctioned  item The authorities'  value  of the auctioned  item  may be fairly easy to assess
if there  are well-developed  secondary  markets  for it (e.g. as for some  Treasury  Bill auction  markets).
Parallel  foreign  exchange  markets  Oegal  or illegal)  were present  for all the SSA auctions,  but except
in the case of Nigena these  were not resale markets.  hes  parallel  markets, at least initialy, were
typically  thin and restricted  markers:  the black  rate, in particular,  being  su  bject to various  influences
making  it an undesirable  anchor (see Aron and Elbdawi,  1992).  Uganda  and Ghana leglsed  the
parallel  market (as the bureaux  market) and encouraged  its deepening  over time.  nterviews  have
suggested  that these  bureaux  markets  were used as a guide  in reserve  pricing. Both tee  counties
used unannounced  reserve prices, while Zambia and Nigera did not use reserve pricing. The
stabiizing effect of such a 'crawling peg" system is apparent  from the Figures la-d, and contrasts
with erratic  behavior  of the exchauge  rate in the other two coutries.  The dramatic  fail-off  of the
bid-spread  over time inthese  two counties (Table  2) suggests  that bidders  may  have  learnthte reserve
price policy rule, and bid more efficiently.  If a reserve price is used, there may be a transpany
advantage  in announcing  it each  week just before  opening  the bids.'°
There may  be similar  stabilizing  advantages  to pr-ouncing  supply  and sticking  to it. Pre-
announcemet Gust  before  opening  the bids)  occurred  for all  auctions  in Nigeria.  In Zambia,  a geneal
Twis s  the practic  in Bolivia:  the  tmvec price and supply  were announced  only  after te  sealed  bids were in-
kt is important to  note  though tha only in 1071107 days did demand exceed  supply  (the  avenge dal  aucton  supply
over fivc  ycarn  was $SA  million).  This  rate  contasts with the SSA auctions,  where  excess demand  was nmsly the
order of the day. Further,  with smal parallel  markets  and near hyper-inllation  gabIztion  of the rate.  ratha than
unification,  was Bolivias  primary  objective.10-
ceiling  of $5 milion was declared  for auctions 1-19, raised to $9 million  for auctions  20-52, and
dropped  to $5.5 million  for auzcdons  53-68;  but except for auctions  55-68,  this bore little relation  to
actual  supply  (Table  1). Both  Zambia  and Nigeria  were subject  to sharp  appreciations  through  periodic
massive  disqualifications  of bids. Supply  was not announced  in Ghana, and was volatile (Table 2).
Supply  was  naounced only  just prior to opening  the bids in Uganda,  but while  pre-announced  supply
was fairly  constant,  actual  supply  was  fairy volatile  (Table 2). It seems  likely  that an uncerain supply
could  foster uncertainty and place a premium on the amount bid, in the absence  of a predictable
reserve  price- It would  thus be interesting  to test  the impact  of supply  volatility  on the behavior  of the
marginal  auction  rate.
The publication  of bids occurred  weekly  in Zambia, listng each importer's  bid, by quantity,
price  and use, for auctions  37-68. Uganda  published  the list of composite  bids by price and quantity,
idiucating  disqualifications.  Nigeria and Ghana  did not publish details of the auctions.  Whether the
spectrum  of bids should be published  has no clearcut answer: it may crexte confidence  thrugh
trsparency.  aad enhance  learning,  which were the intentions  in Zambia.  On the other hand, when
the number  and nature of bidders  becomes  known,  this may foster collusion  in repeated,  sequentil
auctions.  Collusion  is less likely  to manter  in an auction with a large number  of bidders, however.
-2.6  Tnsparency
An impornt  lessonfrom  the  Zambian  auction  is ta  if there  isn't transparency  inthe auction,
it is probably  poiless  holding  one. The degree of trmsparency of rules and management  differed
across  the auctions.  'ransparency was  poor in Zambia  and Niria  Ad  hoc intrventions and frequent
rule changes  by auction managers were an important  cause of instability,  fosering uncertainty,
incredibility  aDd  resulting  in  poor (non-market)  allocation.  The  auction  rules in Zambia  actuly  stated
that the Central  Bank had license  to disqualify  any bid without  having  to give any reasons: this was
a serious  design fault." Auctions  in Ghana  and Uganda  were operted with tanarently,  with clear
ndes, and the public opening  of the bids. The management  committee  in Ghana  did not only consist
of Central  Bank personnel,  but included  representatives  from the private sector. There was fairly
broad  consultation  on changes  in the Cental Bank's regulabons  for the  auction,  which  were published
as amendments. 
3.  A STATISTICAL  ANALYSIS  OF MICRO-AUCTION  DATA  IN SSA
This section examines  the evidence  on the evolution of the auction rate and other auction
variables  for each  of the four African  countries. The objective  of this section  is to use  h  cs
"This  was exercised in  auction 41, for instace,  wher  all bids largW than 8 kwachaiS were abhrarily  declared to
be d  fied
' 2 n interiew at the I.M.F. in I993 revcaled  thl  foreign xchange  auctns  in Ronaniad Klaaktn  were at
hat time  less thn  anspar,  and tbat  this ws  pving  debitadng to the fuctioing  of the aucions.- ~~~~~~~~-  11  -
of auctions  data  to draw  some  empirical  regulaities: (i)  to  account  for the behavior  of the auction  rate
L terwm  of the impact  of various  fudamentls,  as well  as policy intvention,  policy  credibility  and
uncruinty;  (ii) to atempt to link particular  data characteristics  to different  outcomes,  regarding  the
auction objectives  (e.g. exchange  rate unification);  and (iii) to inform a futher and more rigorous
analysis  on testing theoretical  propositions  firom  auction theory (Aron and Elbadawi, 1994b).  The
analysis  of this section  is centered  around three broad methodological  issues.  First, basic summry
statistics  for each country  will be analyzed  for the overall  auction  period  as well as for the episodes
identified  in section  2 above. Second,  the distributional  properties  of the auction  variables  will be
studied,  focusing  on the  extent  to which innovations  from  these  variables  exhibit  departures  from  non-
normality.  Third, the section  condudes with a discussion  of stationarity  issue of individual  auction
or data series.
3.1  Standard Descriptive  Statistics.
Table 2 provides  basic  summary  statistics  of auction  data from Ghana,  Nigeria, Uganda  and
Zmbia,  on prices, price spreads, foreign exchange quani,ties 1 number of bids and bureaux or
black/auction  prema. The  results  broadly  corroborate  the analysis  of the typology  of auction  designs
and policies  in the four countries. A summary  of the evidence  follows.
Auction  prices (auction  rate, maxmum and minimum  bids) have  been  fairly stable in Ghana
and Uganda,  while in contrast  they have been rather volatile  in Nigeria  and Zambia. For example,
the range  of auction  rates  (in terms  of domestic  currency  per US$)  was  970-1042  in Uganda  and 317-
395 in Ghana (in the second  auction  regime),'3  compared  to a range of 3-5 for Nigeria  and 5-25 for
Zambia  (also see Figure 1). Stability  of auction  prices  has improved  around  a depreciating  tend in
Ghana as the auction  progressed  from a retail to a wholesale,  auction while volatiit  increased  in
Zambia with the change  from competitive  to Dutch pricing.  In Nigeria, however, auction rae
volatiity has declined,  pehaps due to  the stabilizig effect of the steady  foreign  exchange  supply.
The average  max-min  bid spread  for example  declined  in Ghana and Nigeria,  in contrast  to Zambia.
Except for Nigeria, for which the foreign  exchange  supply has been between  US$50120
million,  foreign  exchange  supplies  have  been  rather volatilel 4 ranging  from minima  of USS  (million)
2.60, 0.33 and 0.85, to ma  xima  of USS (million)  20.80, 3.48 and 18.48, in Zambia,  Uganda  and
Ghana,  rspectively. in all of the four countries  foreign  exchange  supply  has been  almost  always  less
than  demand,  but the  evolution  of this ratio  over time has  been  yet another  dcractrstc  of  the foreign
exchange  auction  seting Ghana  and Ugmada  apart  from  Nigeria  and Zambia. The  supply  demand  ratio
in Ghana  increased  from an average  of 0.85 during  the retail  auction  to an average  of 0.87 during  the
wholesale,  while the ratio remained quite high at an average  rate of 090 in Uganda. On the other
13  In fact the auction rate was quite volaLi  in Ghan  during the fist  rtail  auction. where the maximum sct was
314.0O  relave  to a minimum  of only 128.00.
4 "The level non-sftionarisy  of the variable involved,  especially  the aucion prics.  imis options  for the use of
standard  devation  or coefficient  of varanon  as measues of volatilty. For te  kvel vanbles in Tabk 2. the volatiliy
measure i-s the  diflfrenee betwen.  the aveage  minimum ad  mamum  viabes.hand, demand rationing increased in the other two countries as their auctions changed from
competitive  to Dutch  pricing, with  supply  ratios  declining  from 0.90  0.87 in Nigeria,  and from  0.68
to 0.45 in Zambia.
For the case of Zambia,  the same  story can  be told for the winning  to total bids ratio, which
declined  dramatically  frm  an average  of 0.65 to 0.42 between  tde two auction  regimes. This is a
direct  result of the increasing  frequency  of interventions  and bids disqualifications  that took place in
the Zambian  auction. Interventions/disqualifications  have  also taken  place in Nigeria;  unlike  Zambia,
the bid total excludes  these  disqualifications,  so that the successful  ratio is high  at its average  of 0.86
in the competitive  auction,  and 0.89 in the Dutch. On the other  hand, the same  ratio remained  high
at 0.92 on average  for Uganda,  and was lower  *  0.78'5  over the retail auction  in Ghana.
The blacklauction  premium  rose from 1.33  to 1.59 bween  the two auction  pricing regimes
in Zambia,  while it almost  remained  constant  ([.36 to 1.33) between  the two similar  regimes  in the
Nigerian auction.  On the contrary, the buremux/auction  premium declined  dramatically  in the
Ghanaian  aucion from an average  of 1.31  for the retail  regime to only 1.06 for the wholesale. For
Uganda  the premium  rates averaged  1.19 o 1.24 overall.
To conclude, it is important  to emphasize  that the increasing  (or constant)  and high premia
that prevailed  in the Nigerian  and Zambian  auctions,  are the uldmate  outcome  of the above  auction
design!policy mistkes  in  these  two  counries.  The  frequent  and  some  imes  arbirary
interventionsldisqualifications  have  fostered  an atmosphere  of policy  incredibility,  lack  of  transparency
and collusive  behavior.  In addition,  the absence  of a reserve  price policy  in the two, countries  fiurder
compromised  stability  of auction  prices. For a reserve  price to be sustainable,  however,  it has to be
consisten with a stable  relevant  macroeconomic  signal, such as the parallel  or bureaux  rate. Given
the rather unsable macoonomic  environmet dtat prevailed  in these two countries  during the
auction  experment, both  the bureaux  and the  parallel  market  could  not constte  efficient  secondary
markets. These are exacdy the problems  that the Ghanaian  and Ugandan auctions  seemed  to, have
avoided, hence their success at achieving  exchange  rate unification-the  key objective  of foreign
exchange  auction  in SSA.
3.2  Normality iss
Given the results on the non-stionarity of most of the auction data (see sub-section  3.3
below), the analysis  of ihis sub-section  will be based on the rates of changes  of the variables in
question  (A;xt  = logX4-logX.  I)  The departure  from normality  is another  characteristic  freqently
observed in economic  data that has important  implications  for the analysis of variability and
uncertainty. In a recent paper, Pritchett  (1991)  found  that the time series data developing  countries
real exchange  rates tend to be characterized  by excess krtosis  (relatively  large probabilities  of
exeme  observations)  and skewne  (tendency  of extreme  observations  in one tail). Pritchett's  results
suggest  that when  there  are significant  higher  order moments  (skewness  and/or  kurtosis),  the standard
t Data on the number  of bids  as  not available  for  the Gha  whoksale  auction.- 13 -
deviation  measure  of variability  may  not be an adequate  proxy  for uncertainty. As we will see below,
the analysis  of this subœection  will lend firther evidence  on the differentiated  data characteristics
between  Ghana  and Uganda  on one hand and Nigeria  and Zambia  on the other. Furthermore,  given
the importance  of uncertainty  (of foreign  exchange  supply, for example)  for the analysis  of bidding
behavior  in the auction  (Aron  and Elbadawi 1994b),  the ts  for normality  is crucial  for this study.
Separate  skewness  and  kurtosis  tests for the rates  of changes  in auction  variables  are provided
in Table 3, two for skewness  (b3  and s)  and one for kautsis (b'16  The fi  skewness  ts  is the
scaled  third moment  of the  distribution  about  the mean  scaled  by the standard  error, the second  is the
standad  deviation  normalized  difference  of the maximum  rate  of change  minms  the absolute  value  of
the  rate of change. Values less (arger) than zero indicates  left (right) skewness. The
excess  huois  coefficient  is given by the ratio of the fourth moment  to the square of the second
moment  minus 3.  A value significandy  dfferent from zero for this statistic indicates  a kurtotic
underlying  data generating  process. Critical  values  for each  of  the three tests are derived  under a null
of a normal  distnrbution.  Table  3 also contains  a column  on standard  deviations  and two more  columns
(s2  and s 3) giving  the ratio of the value of the maximum  (and  the absolute  value  of the minimum)  rate
of change  relative  to the absolute  value of the average  change.
The results  of Table 3 show that the distribution  of the auction  rate is markedly  asymmetric
in all of the four countries,  with a pronounced  tendency  towards  large depreciation  (right skewness)
in the cases of Ghana  and Uganda, while in the case of Nigeria  and Zambia  a significant  tendency
towards appreciation  (eft skewness)  is observed  (see also Fig. 2).  For the cases of Ghana and
Uganda  (Nigeria  and Zambia),  the null hypothesis  of a symmetric  distbution against  the alternative
of right (left)  skewness  could  easily  be rejected  at conventional  levels,  using both  of the two skewness
tests. This findin on the  differentiated  distributional  cteristcs of the auction  rate between  Ghana
and Uganda  on one hand and Nigeria  and Zambia  on the other, is fairly consistent  with the auction
designs  and outcomes  in each of the two groups  of countries. In the first two counries the reserve
price effectively  ruled out exchange  rate appreciation,  while  on the last two the absence  of a rese
pnce and the frequent  disqualification  of bidders and the subsequent  reduced  effective  demand  for
foreign  exchange  within  the auction  have fosed  a tadency towards exchange  rate appreciation.
Also  in terms  of auction  outcomes,  the tendency  towards  depreciation  in Ghana  and Uganda  appeas
consistent  with the success of these two countries in closing the auction/bureaux  rate premium
(unification),  while  the opposite  happened  in Nigeria and Zambia.
As with the auction  rate, te  distributions  of the bureaux  excange rate and premia  in Ghana
and Uganda  also exhlbits  departure  from symmetry,  albeit  witi a tendency  towards  appreciation  (left
skewness).  This  behavior  is consistent  with a fiequendy,  sometimes  significantly,  declHning  premium,
Pritfchct  noted that in smal sampes it is difficut to distinguish  betwe  skewnss and  kurtosis.  given  tat  a
hi kinodc, the criiad levels genated  for skewne  tess assu5ming  a N(0,1) will  t be corrt  and the test
wil have  a tendency  to rica  the null  of zero skewness  in this case. Pritchtt prvides  critical  values  lbr skewness  tests
under the null of a moze  geneal symmetric,  but kuhtotic  distribution  (the  student  t- distributn).  The tes  of table 3
abstact from this compfication.  However,  the number  of obserirtios  avaiable to us is much lrger  than do
Pntchs.- 14 -
as the depreciation in the bureaux rates began to  fall short of the auction rates depreciation.
Futhermore, the bureaux razes  seem to be frequently bat only incrementally  depreciating,  while
adjustment  to previous  overshooting  (excess lagged depreciations)  or movements  towards a lower
longer-m  equilibria  have  caused  substantial  and not infrequent  appreciations.1 7 On the other hand,
the two variables  (black  market)  have bad a significant  but rightly skewed  distribution  in the case  of
NigeriL The tendency  towards  a rising premium  and depreciatng  black  rates could  be explained  by
a combination  of two factrs:  an unstable  macreconomic environment  leading to sustained  black
rate's depreciation,  coupled  with auction  policies that limit depreciation  of the auction  rate. For the
case  of Zambia,  no significant  departues from symmetry  could  be esublished  for either the premium
or the black ra-"e'
In Ghana  and Uganda,  the distributions  of supply  variables  are characAized  by  significant
right skewness,  while demands  have been negatively  skewed. This implies  that in order to ensure
convergence  of the auction  rate  towards  a unified  target rate, the auction  foreign  exchange  supply  has
been successively  adjusted  upwards, in the face of declning demand, as the auction  rate becomes
more deprecated. As with other auction  variables,  the story is different  for the cases  of Nigeria and
Zambia. The supply and demand  variables  do not show signficant depure  from symmetry  for
Zmbeia,  while  only die demand  variable  exhlbits  sigaificant  left skewness  in the case of Nigeria.
The latter appears  consistent  with the frequent recourse  to the policy of disqualification  of bidders
noted for Nigeria  (section  2).
The final issue on symmetry  relates to last two column  of Table 3, which gives the ratio of
the maximum  (and the minimum  absolute  value)  of the rates of change  relative  to the average  of the
absolute values of the rates of chane.  For the aution  rate, for example, this indicates how much
larger the biggest  depreciation  (or the absolute  value  of the biggest  apprecation)  is than  e typical
raze of dange.  The results show rather dramatic orders of magnitud on the deparre  from
symmetry,  especially  in the cases  where  deviations  fiom symmetry  were found  to be significant For
exampe, the maximum  appreciation  (si) of the auction rates are more than  seven tmes the average
absolute  rate of change  in Zambia,  and more than six times the average  in Nigeria. On the other
band, the maximum  depreciations  (si) of the auction  rates are more than eleven fimes  the average
absolute  rate of chage in Ghana  and about  nine times the average  in Uganda.
The other aspect of deparue  from normlity  is provided by excess kurtosis, where the
underlying  distibution is more  peaked  and fatter tailed dtan the norma, implying  a larger relative
pobabiity  of extreme observations  in both tails.  The evidence on this score is even more
overwhelming.  Except for the ditributions of demand and the premium in Zambia, the null
hypothesis  of a zero excess kurtosis  could  be rejected  in all other auction  variables  in all of the  four
-7  S'c  the burmux  (black)  rtc  is  subs  influenc  by  aicution  of futum  auction  systen  libealisatiR
changes  may  be appat  in  the rate  befdc  they  actuaUy  ccwur.
Thbis  may be cxplained  by dte faict  only monly  black market  dat  was avalable for Zambia-
lDh  reason  is  ta  total  demand  is  repotd,  which  cludes  bids  that  tl  disquarlified- 15  -
countries. These results provide  additional  evidence  on the prevalence  of departure  from normality
in foreign  exchange  auction  data in Sub-Saharan  Africa. However,  in this case  auction  data  could  not
be differentiated  between  the two groups  of countries.
Concerning  variability,  it has been pointed out by Pritchett  that when there is significant
deparure from  normality,  the standard  deviation  may not be the appropriae indicator  of uncerinty.
For example  the rates of changes  in the auction  rate and the premium  in Zambia  have  almost  similar
standard deviations at 0.10  and 0.09,  respectvely.  However, they have two very different
distributions,  the auction  rate has a non-symmetric  and substantially  left skewed  kurtotic  distribution,
while the premium  had a kurtotic  but symmetric  distnbution. Another  point mentioned  by Pritchet
is that under departure from normality, there may be several but very contadictory measure  of
variability,  none of which  has a clear advantage  over die others. This point  is validated  in our case
by comparing  the standard  deviations  of the auction  rates  in Nigeria  and Zambia  which  are very smal
at 0.08 and 0.10, respectively,  to the ones  for Uganda  at 1.98 and Ghana  at 9.91.  This, however,
-conzradicts  Figure 1 which  shows that exacdy  the opposite  happens.?
3.3  Unit Roots, Sructural  Shifts and Stationarity Issues.
The hypothesis  of the unit root (loosely  speaking,  this refer to a time series wi  an infinite
variance  at the limiit) in the  individual  economic  time series  data  has geeratd  considerable  attendon
and acceptability  in recent  empirical  and theoretic,'  economic  research. The seminal  paper  by Nelson
and Plosser (1982)  which found that most macroeconomic  varibles have a univara  time series
structure  with a unit root, and the more  recent  path-breaking  work  on cointegracion  theory9 (Engle
and Granger, 1987)  has provided  the impetus  for a burgeoning  research  programn  that has already
started  to have far-reaching  implications  for both theory  and empincal  work  in economics. The  most
important  economic  implication  of the unit ro  hypothesis  is that random  shocks  have permanent
effects on economic  variables. In our context  this means  that the fluctataions  that chracterize the
auction variables  are not ranitory.  Therefore,  it is important  to conduct  careful  testing  of the unit
D Perhaps  this contradiction  coud bc resolved  by using  the coefficent of variation  rahe  than the staniard
deviation.
'Formally. Id y=  TDt,  + Z,  bc an econonic series  composed  of a deterministic  trnd  TD 1 and a 5ochastic
component.  For simplicity assune  that 4  ca  be desctibed by an autoregrcssiv_moving  averagc process:
A(L),  = B(L) cj, whe  A(LJ  and B(L) arc polynomials  in the lag operator  fr and e, is a sequence  of iLd.  innovaton.
The noise finction Z7  is asumed to have mea  zero,  the moving  avenage  polnomial is also assumed  to have roots
srictly outside  the  ni circl.  Then  Z, has a unit  root if A(L) has one unit root and all ado  roots stiey  outside  the
unit circle  In this case (I-L)Z, = AZ,  is a  stationmy  procss and (1-Lby,  = Ay,  is staionary around  a fixed  man,  If 
on the other hand A(L) has all its roots outside  the unit circle,  the  Z is a statinr  process  and y, is stationary  aound
a trend-
-Thc  idca of conte_tio  basically  states that even though  individual  series  may have  a unit  root, thcre may cxst9
various linear  combinations  of variables  which are statay.  Stated  more formally  in the context  of te  definigion  of
footnote  1, kt the n-vector  y, be comnposed  of (yb ...  yj.  whcem  Ya  i  dcfined  in footnote  I above. Then y, is sai  to
be coinegmted if there exists  at  ast  one n-elmnt  vector  0 such that  'y, is trd  sttonay.  This is a mider
definition  of cointegrtion (Campbell  and Pern,  1991),  which  is more suited  to anablsis  of eoonomic  date since  it
permits  the inion  of ddernmntic components  (such  as tends and structural  break dummics)  in the cointegration
model  along  wiith  other  z-stuuionary  stochastic  vanabls.- 16-
root hypothesis  for each of the auction  variables  of interest These  tests are presented  in Aron and
Elbadawi  (1994): in all four countries,  the data series for each of the thtee exchange  rate variables
(the auction,  bureaux  rates and the premium)  was found to have a unit root non-ationary process.
Noting  that the distinction  between  a random  walk  (unit root) and a trend-stationary  series is
extreme,  Cochrane (1988)  argues that there are many cases where a stationary  but a slow trend-
reverting  series could  be confounded  with unit root series. To address  this problem  with unit root
tests, he proposed  a variance  ratio test that basically  asks the following  question: How large is the
variance  of shocks to the random walk or permanent  component  of the series compared  with the
variance  of the growth rates of -the  series? Or, equivalently,  How big is the random  walk in the
series? The ratio is given by  l  "  X  . For a stationary  series the ratio will eventually
converge  to zero as k goes to infinity,  the speed of this convergence  reflects the extet  to which the
stationary  time series stucture is doser to either of the two polar cases: the stationary  (zero  root)
or the random  walk (unit  root). On  the other  hand a unit  root series will  have a ratio that settle  down
to the share of the variance  of the shock  to the random  walk component  in the total variance  (>  0).
Figure 3 shows the plots of the Cochrane  ratio for the auction  equilibrium  exchange  rates against  k
for each  of the four auctions. The auction  rate is much  closer  to the unit root case in both  the Ghana
and Uganda,  where the shares  of the random  walk in total variance  settle down  to approximately  77
percent  in Ghana  and 96 percent in Uganda24 Particularly  in the case of Ghana,  the ratios have in
fact  diverged  for a prolonged  time before  sarting to converge  at k = 62. On the other hand, random
walk components  account  for about  54 percent  of total variance  of the auction  rate in Zambia, and
only about 6 percent of total variance in Nigeria.  Furtermore,  convergence of the varimae  ratios
have  strted rather rapidly  (at k = 2) in both countries. This finding  is again  fairly consistent  with
the stochastic  reserve price3 that has had a significant  effect on the auction rates in Ghana and
UgaXlda,  as opposed to the frequent and direct policy inteventions  that characterized the Nigerian and
Zambian  auctions. Therefore  it is obvious  that the auction  rate is chacterized  by high  persistence
(random  walk component),  which  agrees  with the unit root tests in Aron and Elbadawi  (1994). But
Figure?v  also shows  the presence  of substantial  temporary  components  in the innovation  v=arices of
these  series, especially  in the case of Nigeria  and Zambia. This is also in general agreement  with
the prevalence  of detrministic trends and regime  shifts.in  auction  rates and auction data  (Figure 1).
The lawge  sarmpl standard  error for the ratio is given  by  '  tarQC_) 1d) where T is the number  of
observations., 
7' The  cboice of the temminal  k is rathcr arbiray.  but following  Cochmne  we chose  the maximunm  k to be the ine
of one Iounh to a third of ihe total number  of observations.
- The  reserve prc  closely  fosilow  the evolution  of the burauz  or paradel rates in Ghana  and Ugmada  which are
shown  to  be l(l)  scries  Table  4).- 17 -
4.  A  MACRO-ECONOMIC  OVERVIEW  OF  THE  SSA  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE
AUCTIONS.
It is not our inteton  to exami  in any detail the macro-determinants  of the aucton rate in
this paper?' However,  we present in this secton a brief overview  of dte macro-econmic environment
in dte four countries, with the objective  of explaining  the observed  differentiated  outcomes  of foreign
excdange  auctions in the fur  countries. The mac-economic sty  is provided  by Figures 1 and 4,
fucusing  on exchange  rate  prenia and monetary  emission.  The broad conclusion  that can be derived
from dise  graphs points to the  importance of a  stable macro-economic  envirnment  for  the
achievement of a steady and susainable  progress towards a unified exchange rate.
Ghana and Uganda  seem Do  be largely on arget regarding the above objective. Figures 1 b
and I c show a steadiy depreciatng and sable auction  rate over  sime, while  a significantly  declinin
bureaxlaucion  pmium  is observed. Thus, tese  countries  have been able to achieve  a reasonable
degree of unification  and exchange  rate stability. At the heart of this outcome, as shown by Figures
4 b and 4 %  is a sutined  decline in mo  gow  This is reflected  in a decelemaion  in inflatio
and a stable  buream rate in both Uganda  and Ghana, where  in Ghana  this folowed an episode  of deep
depreciation  towards  what appears  to be an eqauibrium  path Th  figues also show a clear leadllag.
effect going  fom monetay emsion  to iatim  and bureaux  rat  depreciato  This indica  that not
only has macro-policy  been consistent,  but also  a  it has been credible in these two countrie
In contrast,  in Nigeia and Zambia Figures 1 a and 1 d also show a deprecating maction  rate,
but with far greater volatility. More importantly,  unlike the othe  two countries, the black/auction
premium was steadily rising. Thi  oumers  both the objectives of stabiit  and exchange rate
unification.  This could be a direct outcome  of  utaiable  macro-economic  policy and the collapse
of policy  credity.  This is crborated  by Fgures 4 a and 4  . Very volatie and significently
rising rates of growth of money  suppy over dme are observed  in both coutis.  This is reflected  in
high inflation  and blacklauction  premiavariability, with exteded episodes  of sharply rising prmia.
The relevance of macroeconomic poliy  in  - -if  between  acdon outcomes in Ghana
and Uganda  on one hand and Nigeria and Zambia  on the othe, is fairly consistent  and closely  linked
with the eviden  on the microeconomic  dermina  of die auction rate (sections  2 and 3). For
example,  die reserve  price policy in Ghana and Uganda  has been credited  with fostering auction  rate
stability.  For tese  two conries  to manage  a scssful  reser  pruice  policy, a susable  secondary
market signal is necsay.  This was provided  by a fairly stable bur  rate, made possible%y a
credible  maco-enviroment  These results are also corroboratd by the more fomal analrysis  of Aron
and Elbadawi  (1994).
YHowcvc.  in a subsequ  pmr  we  PIa to anays  =ac-coooic  nies  in the coun  of  ueon  md
ccbmge rae aifimtios  in SSA--18 -
5.  CONCLUSIONS  AND POLICY LESSONS.
The experience  of foreign  exchange  auctions in SSA has been  one of rich and diversified
design  features,  policy  interventions  and  outcomes.  This paper  has compared  and contrasted  auction
designs  and outcomes  across four SSA  countries  and produced  a typology  of SSA  foreign  exchange
auctions.  Two distnct sets of countries  have been identified  in temLs  of design features, auction
policies and outcomes.  Ghana  and Uganda  represent  a set where auctions  have  been judged to be
largely  on taget  in terms  of the three  policy  objectives  of exchange  rate unification,  stabilisation  of
the exchange  rate and an efficient  allocation  of foreign  exchange.  On  the other  hand, the auctions  in
Zambia and Nigeria were subject to frquent  policy interventions,  with the consequence  of
unsustainable  auctions,  inefficient  allocation  through ad hoc disqualifications  (at least in Zambia),
lImited  unification,  and a rather volatile  exchange  rate. Ihe  condusions  of this analysis  are broadly
corroborated  by a statistical  analysis  of the micro-auction  data for all four countries.  A summary  of
the main stylised  facts  and their possible  explanations  foilow-
First, auction  prices  have  been  fairly  stable  in Ghana  and Uganda,  while  in contrast  they have
been  rathr volatile  in Zambia  and Nlgeria.  Stability  of prices improved  around  a deprecating  trend
in Ghana  as the auction  progresed from a retail to a wholesale  auction.  In Zambia,  price stability
decreased  from the competitive  to the Dutch  auction;  while in Nigeria  the  reverse  was  true, perhaps
due to the effect of stable supply. Empirical  evidence  on the depature from normality  of  hie
differenced  auction rate is provided  by skewness  test  on auction data All fbur countries  show
marely  asymmetric  auction rates; Nigeria  and Zambia have a significa  tendency  toward left
skewness  (apreciation),  while  Ghanaand  Ugandadisplay  apronounced  tendency  towards  depreciation
(right skewness).  For all countries,  appreciation  or depreciation  tends to show  a very hi,gh  order of
magnitude  for the absolute  value  of highest  appreciation  or depreciadon  relative  to the average  rate
of change.  Thus, departure  from symmetry  is not trivial  when  it it is statsticaUy  significant.  Further,
excess kurtosis  is significant  in all data in all auctions,  which implies  a high  probability  of extem
observatio  in both tails of the distrbution of auton  data Kurtosis  measures  do not offer any
criteria  for differendating  between  the countries,  but reinforce  the point  that the standard  deviation
is not a useful  measure  of exchange  rate variability  given  these deparures  from normality.
An explanation  for increased  stability  in our first set of countries  is that Ghana  and Uganda
used (unannounced)  reserve  prices, while  Zambia  and Nigeria did not This "crawling  peg" type
system  prevented  appreciation  in the presence  of disqualifications.  At the  same  time the depreciation
path of the exchange  rate was smoothed  as bidders learnt the reserve  price  rle,  which is perhaps
evidenced  by the dramatic  fal-off of dhe  bid-spread  over time in Ghana  and Uganda. Furhermore,
in Ghana  and Uganda,  not only were the paralel markets  legal (bureaux  markets),  but the macro-
policies  followed  were relatively  consistent: ese  two facts  allowed  the bureaux  rate to constitute  a
credible  and efficient  secondary  market  signal  for the  reserve  price  rule. It would  be interesting  to test
the  observed  differences  in exchange  rate  depreciation  across  regimes,  such  as Dutch  and competitive
pricing,  or retail and wholesale  auctions.- 19-
Second  foreign  exchange  supply  was  found  to be rather volatile  in all countries  save  Nigeria,
where a pre-announced  supply  rule was adhered  to. Differenced  foreign  exchange  supply  in Ghana
and Uganda is characterised  by significant  zight skewness,  suggesting at  supply was  successively
adjusted  upwards  to allow  convergence  of the auction  rate to a unified  target rate, as the  auctions  were
liberalised.  The opposite  holds for Zambia  and Nigeria. It would  be useful to ascertain  whether  this
volatility  influenced  the path of thie  exchange  rate. The implication  of the observed  non-normality  of
the supply variable  is important  for its use as a proxy for uncertainty.  The preceding  discussion
suggests  that where  supply  volatility  is high, which may raise  uncertainty  in thin markets,  there may
be considerable  virtue in the use of a reserve price.
-ird,  foreign  exchange  rationing  reflected  in the total to satisfied  demand  ratio was  at a high
level  in the Zambian  and Nigerian  auctions,  while  it remained  constant  and  low in Ghana  and  Uganda.
Similarly,  the winning  to total bids ratio declined  dramatically  in Zambia,  while  remaining  at a very
high average  level in Uganda  (data  are missing  for the other  two countries).  In Ghana  and Uganda
the auction systems  were gradually widened,  increasing competition,  fostering confidence  in the
system  and importantly  deepening  financial  markeas  by allowing  insttuion-building over ime.  This
gradualism  allowed  the transition  to a less concentrated  interbank market, less liable to collusive
practices.  By cont,  auctions  in Zambia  and Nigeria saw restrictions  tightened  over time in an
aempt to suppress  depreciation.  It would  be interesting  to assess  the impact  of increased  competition
through an enlarged  set of bidders  and allowable  imports on thfe  level and stability  of the exchange
-rate.
jFourh,  the parallel  market premium  was high for Zambia  and Nigeria, whilst  the bureaux
premium  experienced  a sustained  and sharp decline  for Ghana  and Uganda  over ime. In Ghana  and
Uganda  the bureaux  rates and premia exhibit departures  from symmetry,  with a tendency  towards
appreciaton (left skewness).  This is consistent with a steady and incremental  depreciation,  and
infrequent  but somedmes  significant  appreciation  as a response  to past overshooting,  or adjustment
towards a longer-term  equiium  On the other hand, Nigeria displays right skewness;  while in
Zambia,  where  data  only of lower frequency  was  available  for the black market  (montily)  there is no
evidence  of skewness.
The tendency  towards  a rising premium  and depreciating  black rates can be explained  by a
combination  of two factors: an unstable  macro-economic  environment,  coupled  with micro-auction
policies  that atempted  to curtail  depreciation.  The brief  macro-analysis  in this paper  suggest that the
unsustanable  macro-economic  policies  in Nigeria  and Zaribia  had a major impact  on credibility  and
the size of the parallel  premia.  The  key macro-policy  lesson  is that these two counties did not make
the commitment  to switch the nominal  anchor  from the exchange  rate to the money  supply,  despite
their clmed  policy  objective  of exchange  rate unification.
Onthemicro-side,  the  frequentand  sometimes  arbitary interventions/disqualificationsftered
an atmosphere  of policy incredibility,  lack of transparency  and collusive  behavior. A major lesson
from  the Zambian  and Nigerim  auctions  is that if there isn't transparency  in the auction,  it is  probably
pointless  holding one.  Ghana achieved  transparency  in a very effective  manner: the management
commtee did not only consist of Central Bank personnel, but included  repr  ve  from the-20 -
commercial  banking  sector and private sectr,  and was chaired by a commercial  banker.  There was
fairly  broad consultation  on changes  in the Central Bank's regulations  for the auction,  and rules and
amendments  to rules were published.  Uganda  similarly  operated with a high degree  of trasparency,
with public opening  of the bids.
Fijh. one final  set of empirical  analyses  reveals  the presence  of considerable  non-stationarity
and regime shifts for most of the auction  data from the four countries.  This is unsurprising  in view
of the above  stylised facts  which emphasise  nrle changes,  the non-normality  of auction  data and the
importance  of anticipations  ofpolicy  changes.  The  non-parametric  variance  ratio  test CCochrane,  1988)
showed  that the share of the random  walk  component  in the total variance  of the  rate of change  in the
auction  rate, while large for all of the counties, is noticeably  smaller for Nigeria  and to some  extent,
Zambia.  The rate of convergence  also strted rather more  rapidly  in these  two countries.  This finding
is again  consistent  with the use of a stochastic  reserve  prioe  in Ghana  and Uganda  (i.e. based on the
non-stationary  bureaux series), as opposed to the frequent and direct policy interventions  that
charactsed  the Zambian  and Nigerian  auctions.  These results on non-stationarity  have profound
implications  for the way in which auction  data are analysed:  random shocks  have permanent  effects
on economic  variables,  and consistent ing  of the  behavioural  propositions  of auction  theory  requires
modelling  to account for these data characteristics.
In our companion  paper (Axon  and Elbadawi, 1994b)  we buid  on the results of this paper,
and estimate  dynamic models  influenced  by auction  dteory for the determination  of the auction rae
in these  four countries,  using weekly  micro-auction  data. Our modelling  methodology  aes  account
of the non-stationarity  of the auction data as well as regime changes  and policy interventions.  As
motivated  above, we use dtese models  to test  the impact  on the level of the auction  rate of increased
competition  amongst bidders, the effect of uncertainty (proxied by a volatile supply of foreign
exchange  to tie auction), and dift  pricing  mechaims  (Dutch and marginal  pricing).-21  -
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mimemn  bid  5.00  2.44  7.10  6.47  4.01  6.00  5.11  2.44  7.10
max-nil  spread  2.97  0.55  12.25  607  1.05  12.00  4.16  0.55  12.26
max-oar  spread  1.41  -0.01  0.99  1.43  0.26  5.90  1.42  0.01  9.99
nin-o  spread  1.56  0.03  4.6e  4.84  0.00  9.25  2.74  0.00  9.25
supply 1* mar  5.67  3.10  8.80  6.0%  2.80  20.80  5.90  2.60  20.80
demand CO  mRI)  9.19  3.50  21.70  14.25  5.0B  24.00  11.12  3.50  24.00
suppivldanand  0.08  0.20  1.00  0.46  0.12  0.91  0.69  0.12  1.00
muts  of Mdte
totslno.  bkd  289  101  6o0  462  192  769  3S5  101  760
wkwing/otaI  bids  0.65  0.21  0.9  0.42  0.17  0.98  0.56  0.17  0.19
bleak madket
aeclu/auc  pr.mmum  1.33  1.15  1.90  1.59  1.27  1.93  1.43  1.16  1.93
UGAND)A  - OvERALL  AUCTKIO  11-621
Mean  Mhmau  Maxbnwn
n:
auction  rate  1022.21  970.00  1042.0O
madmum  bid  -1043.73  1010.00  1200.0
miirdmu  bI  101  9.45  900.00  1042.00
:pmb
max-mih  npd  24.27  1.00  200.00
max-oar  spread  21.52  1.00  176.00
mincer  spoad  2.76  0.00  80.00
suppjv1$ InSl  1.80  0.33  3.48
demand  It  rmlW  - 2.02  048  4.0D
wupply/demand  0.90  0.17  1AID
numbe  al  bids!
ttial  no. bids  14.32  7.00  30.00
wnvlnrgftotal  bids  0.92  0.36  1.00
humessm  mainet
burma  rate tel.  T.Cheque)  1216  1192  1264
buresoc bid-ak  speed  0.96  0.90  - 0.97
btrlhuc  priedum  (T.Clque)  .1.109  1.16  1.30
burhsuc preniurn  IcashI  1.24  1.20  1.33-24 -
TABLE  2  iContd.l
GHANA  RETAIL  (1-1761  WHOLESALE  1176-2701  OVERALL  41-270W
Mean  minhnum  Maximum  Mean  Mlninum  Maxinnum  ean  Mlninum  Ma  ximum
aution  rate  216.89  128.00  314.00  368.25  317.00  395.00  288.35  128.00  306.00
mxilmum bid  223.15  152.00  316.00  362.03  318.00  420.00  272.37  152.00  420.00
minimum  bid  213.56  P0.00  314.00  3S7.63  317.00  396.00  264.62  90.00  395.00
mmemin  spred  9.60  2.0D  68.00  4.40  0.00  30.00  7.76  0.00  68.00
max-or  spread  7.26  1.00  51.00  3.78  0.00  27.00  6.02  0.00  51.00
mhar  spread  2.34  0.00  45.00
quendtlls:
supply  P  mull  5.46  1.06  12.38  7.37  0.86  18.46  6.18  0.86  18.48
demand  l*  mIll)  6.78  1.35  17.91  8.82  0.85  19.28  7.47  0.86  19.28
supply/demand  0.85  0.1B  1.00  0.87  0.16  1.00  0.86  0.15  1.11
number  of bid:
wotl no. bids  141  32  468  n  na  no  na  no  na
winnkinltot lbx  0378  0.15  1.00  na  na  no  us  na  - n
bunaux merlkt'
bur. bkidal  spread  0.S5  0.90  0.98  0.37  0.94  0.99  0.98  0.90  0.99
bureewc rate teal  363.21  317.00  377.50  378.76  347.50  440.00  372.44  317.00  440.00
bur/  c. prmnhum  1.31  1.14  1.51  1.06  1.03  1.14  1.18  1.03  1.51
NIGERIA  COMPETITIVE  1-42)  DUTCH  AUCTION  (43-48)  OVERALL  (1483
Mean  minimum  Ma,dnum  Mean  MWnmum Maximum  Mean  Mhiimun  Maximum
puloe.
autio  rate  3.71  3.00  4.90  4.25  3.50  5.28  4.06  3.00  5.28
maximum bid  4.33  3.10  5.60  4.41  4.02  5.30  4.38  3.150  5.60
minimum  bid  3.38  2.50  3.90  4.21  3.50  5.28  3.91  2.50  5.28
mnaxmn  sprea  0.95  0.30  2.64  0.21  0.00  0.90  0.47  0.00  2.64
mar-or-  pread  0.62  0.25  1.85  0.16  0.01  0.90  0.33  0.01  1.86
minoer Bpread  0.33  0.00  1.90  0.04  0.00  0.36  0.15  0.00  1.90
supply (J mill  63.17  50.00  86.00  108.83  70.00  120.00  91.08  50.00  120.00
demand  IJ mili  71.77  38.39  100.10  123.80  64.39  150.00  105.16  38.39  160.00
supplyfdumand  0.90  0.50  1.30  0.87  0.67  1.10  0.88  0.50  1.30
number  of  ldsc
tots  no. bid  38  27  44  48  30  53  45  27  53
wiwnng/ot  bids  0.86  0.34  1.00  0.89  O.SB  1.00  0.88  0.34  1.00
bureauxrn  5.00  4.70  5.70  5.70  4.20  S.o6  5.45  4.20  8.60
burw/ucpiemiun  1.386  1.10  1.67  1.33  1.04  1.75  1.34  1.04  1.7S
SOURCE  Autho-  calcuaions
1.  The  ucton  varable  a-  mostly non-stationery  (Aoand  Elbdrwl.  19941. so that convmenonal meaLe  of variabilit  lIrd
deviotio  are  not  define.
2.  Athough  aN  Zamblan  parastattb wer  iclded  in ebs suction tram aucton 20. the largest ot them continued  to renwv  subtantil  foreign
exchange  with nmrcompetlv  bid  - tw  myhal  rare.  A cornred  value is th  use  for wsppy  in lbs Zambian  regrsons.
3.  Blac market  data or Zambia  me monthly. from Picke  Cumernc  Yearbook,  Weekl  Nigwisn blck  markat  dat  -r  compled from ith World
Bauk  reident mission  satin  ad  Paici. Forign  exchange  buaux  began  functioning in  Ghan from ApdrL  19OE.  Regresidons  ue  some
black  medet data.- 25 -
TAILE 3:  Masuren of  wmaflty for flpt-ulNfrenod  auoden  vadabis.
b,  b  or0  5  S.  S,
N  Skewnss  Kurtosis  Std. Dev.  X..gC  X.. .Ixi
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a
2AMB A-'  '  '  -
aloulerl  67  -2.38  10.22  0.10  -2.87  3.25  7.90
logtlO)  67  -0.16  1.44  0.41  -0.76  3.64  4.74
Ala(R0a.I  -E7  0.81  2.37  0.46  -1.E6  3.18  5.36
aIog(Odl  67  0.47  0.32  0.27  0.84  3.72  2.86
*1OQ(02Idl  67  -0.78  1.71  0.42  -1.30  3.00  4.78
Alogprnmil  57  0.22  -0.78  0.04  0.43  2.01  2.11
aIgipromnl  67  0.12  6.16  0.09  0.68  9.59  7.92
UMANDBA
og(o0r)  86  3.31  12.45  1.99  6.18  9.09  0.00
AlogoIla)  66  0.42  2.86  0.70  0.24  4.79  4.45
AloogOdi  66  -0.06  2.01  0.59  0.31  4.39  3.96
nlog(OaIO  86  0.68  9.73  0.36  .1.03  8.76  6.81
iloogberc)  61  -1.95  8.34  3.58D-3  -1.88  3.48  6.66
aogilpra,  61  -1.46  2.09  4.29  -1.91  2.31  6.26
aIo(psam 0l  S1  -0.80  2.74  4.38  -2.24  2.58  5.53
GRANA
a&logoied  269  2.64  16.30  9.91  2.48  11.81  7.20
AbqglCs)  269  -0.09  4.78  0.41  -0.86  6.47  7.86
l&iCodl  269  -0.9a  5.16  0.41  -2.74  4.44  8.1
ogiIOdM)  269  0.80  5.62  0.29  2.25  9.81  5.87
aloqbar)  196  -1.32  14.77  0.01  -2.08  .06  12.12
Abolpreml  196  -0.85  9.74  0.02  -2.23  5.99  9.72
NVIGMIA 
Mogioer)  66  -1.33  6.71  0.08  -089  5.37  6.84
aloglOal  66  0.38  4.78  0.14  0.45  7.64  6.59
Mlog(gdl  Go  -1.25  5.47  0.1 9  -2.08  3.79  7.29
oig(Os/Qd)  66  1.95  6.86  0.16  2.14  8.06  4.10
&bgogbrl  6e  -0.01  2.55  0.04  0.20  5.08  4.77
Alogpron)  es6  1.30  6.8S  0.09  1.69  7.35  4.58
SOURCE:  Authom calcultions.
NOTES:
1.  The followin  abbreviations  are used: oer bauetion  exhange rte.  leal  currercltl):  Gs  IS suppled): Cs.  (I  uppliad, lass  ora-
competitve  parasal  bids at the maginal  rata  Gld  It  demaededi:  prem Ipwradl Car  bureiuc)Iauction  rate): prest. rmtwpaatad
monthly  promunl:  bar,  (bureau  soll rate for travels  cheques):  bor 0 (bureau  sell  rate for asuh).-26  -
FIGURE I a,b,c,d:  The equilibrium auction price and parallel market premium.
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FIGURE 2 a,b,c,d:  Skewed and kurtotic distributions of auction exchange rate changes.
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FIGURE 3 a,b,c.d:  Codhmne persistence  test for the auction exchange rates.
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FIGUR1E  4 a,b,c,d:  Macroeconomic  policy  indicators and the free excuange  rate.
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